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INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic Transformation is a process that facilitates the emergence of market-
conforming organisations and institutions while discouraging the emergence of 
organisations and institutions which limit private exchange and the functioning of the 
price mechanism. Such a definition draws the attention to several aspects of economic 
transformation, which deserve some better understanding: 
1. The raison d’ etre for a business system based on markets is its superior allocative 
efficiency. In transition economies to demand a better functioning of the price 
mechanism must remain banal so long as markets and private property rights do 
not exist. Allocative efficiency in this case refers rather to the expansion of 
private voluntary exchange between economic actors. 
2. Economic transformation depends therefore on the activities of private economic 
actors and organisations, i.e. there willingness and opportunities to establish 
organisations and agree on institutions by which to govern voluntary exchange. 
3. Organisations and institutions can be harnessed when they become protected by 
national legislation and state enforcement, the sum of which defines an Economic 
Regime which allocates (positive and negative) incentives for embarking into or 
refraining from certain activities.  
4. In transition economies such an economic regime is not a given but depends on 
ongoing legislation and regulation in the political sector which in turn depends on 
the institutions which structure political decision making. Subsequently the 
economic regime is not static, and changes to the regime tend to reflect a political 
compromise rather than pure economic rationale.  
5. By its very nature economic transformation empowers individual actors. 
Searching for business partners, concluding business deals or establishing 
economic organisations, such as firms or networks asks for organisational 
innovativeness. Agreeing on procedures or governance of business relations, on 
the other hand asks for institutional innovation. When the state regards innovation 
as legitimate but outside the range of state interference yet protect worthy they 
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will be regarded as part of the formal constitution or legal. Otherwise they are 
regarded as informal (or illegal). 
6. Organisational and institutional innovation define the transformation path as new 
organisations and institution emerge as a result of private business practices and 
the interaction between the new “private sector” and government agencies. In 
short, reforms, i.e. organisational and institutional innovations negotiated in the 
political sector and  those evolving in the nascent business sector need to pass two 
tests: They must facilitate the expansion of voluntary exchange (i.e. improve 
allocative efficiency), and need to politically feasible. 
 
It is the last point which explains why not all transition economies will end up with the 
same form of a market economy. If we call those who embark on organisational and 
institutional innovation as entrepreneurs then the whole transformation process can be 
expected to reflect the interplay between entrepreneurs, markets, and the political sector. 
Not much empirical research is available that would allow comparing the different 
transformation paths of transition economies, and by doing so identifying features that 
contribute to the speed of transformation or the country-specific characteristics of the 
future variance of a capitalist system.  
 
The purpose of the paper is not to explain China and add to the empirical knowledge but 
to reconceptualise China into one coherent institutional interpretation. This is becoming 
possible on the basis of the rich empirical data available in China-related studies or 
management studies – and the authors fieldwork over five years. 
 
The case of China 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to offer a scaffolding by which the emergence of a private 
business sector can be linked to institutional change in the political arena, where after all 
economic reforms need to be sanctioned. That entrepreneurship responds to the political, 
economic and social environment is of course nothing new (Krug 2006). What is 
however needed is to find a frame that allows systematic and empirical investigation of  
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the causes why different business systems emerge and to which extent the differences in 
business systems reflect differences in institutional choice in the political arena and 
organisational and institutional innovation.   China is a promising example for developing 
such a frame. As empirical studies have shown, it offers a data set where different 
business systems emerged within one political regime. It also offers a data set where the 
difference emerged within one “culture”, provoking the question whether the notion of 
China as one culture is not a myth, or whether the influence of culture is not exaggerated 
in the literature. 
 
China offers some more advantages when it comes to investigating organisational and 
institutional choice in transition economies: 
• Its overall economic performance. China is obviously a case where economic 
transformation delivered the expected results, namely high growth rates and a 
quick change in the capital stock of an economy that allowed the country 
integrating into the world market. As empirical studies have shown, to achieve 
such a result “institutions matter”. This begs the question whether China came up 
with organisational and institutional innovations that need to be regarded as 
crucial factors for explaining overall outcome. 
• Decentralisation. China’s reforms started with a large scale decentralisation 
programme, more precisely the transfer of resources, tax authority and regulatory 
power from the central state to lower (sub-provincial) administrative levels. This 
enabled the local state to opt for a specific economic regime, by setting “defaults” 
for what is regarded as within the limit of the reform programme, and what is 
regarded as “unacceptable” and therefore illegitimate. This is not to say that local 
administrative levels do not need permission from higher levels or the Party. It 
points rather to a weak central authority willing to accept a variety of different 
“experiments”, the best known of which are the Special Economic Zones, the 
emergence (and disappearance) of township and village enterprises (TVEs), and 
most recently the large scale privatisation of small SOEs, the TVEs, and the urban 
collective sector. China therefore invites to search for features which explain 
institutional choice at the local level which in turn is a necessary first step toward 
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comparative studies which allow testing which set of new organisations and 
institutions facilitates economic transformation. Such studies are also needed for 
explaining why different regions in China develop quicker than others and 
whether China will end up as a nation with different domestic business systems. 
• Organisational and institutional innovations. Some organisational and 
institutional solutions localities came up with are surprising. As they are no longer 
reflecting a socialist and not yet reflecting a market economy, they can be called 
(following Williamson 1985) hybrid organisation or hybrid institutions.  To 
which extent these hybrids pave the way toward a capitalist system, whether they 
will disappear with ongoing marketization has so far not yet investigated. For 
example, whether networks are a necessary predecessor for functioning markets 
(as economic history would claim. Greif 1993; Tilly 2001), or whether they are 
the predecessors for rent-seeking coalitions (if not a Mafia: Hellman and 
Schankerman 2000; Frye 2002) is a major aspect of the Grabbing Hand- vs. 
Helping Hand controversy1. Before the effects of hybrids can be assessed, their 
emergence and functioning needs to be analysed. Are they cultural relics to be 
found everywhere in China and can therefore be expected to become a constituent 
factor in the post-transformation business system? Or, do they emerge as a 
“rational” systematic response to a situational constraint within the transformation 
process? If the latter is the case then hybrids might explain the variety of different 
business systems while it can also be expected that they disappear according to 
changes in the situational constraint. 
 
Conceptual issues 
 
The literature is, of course not unaware of the link between the external – political, 
economic or social – environment and organisational or institutional innovation within or 
around firms. Whether linked to the nation state (national innovation systems: Nelson 
1992; North 2005), society at large (legitimation: DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and 
                                                 
1 The Grabbing Hand hypothesis was put forward by Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), the Helping Hand hypothesis can be found in Oi (1995) and Walder (1995). 
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Meyer 1992), or in the form of industrial districts, organisational communities (Aldrich 
1999), and networks (Nooteboom 1999a), all approaches stress the institutional context in 
which such entrepreneurship operates. Thus, there is a consensus that the 
societal/political environment provides business opportunities in form of positive 
incentives and available resources, and limits business opportunities by setting defaults 
for normative (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Aldrich 1999) or cognitive (Witt 2000) 
reasons.  However what is presented here is an analysis which precedes the employment 
of these approaches. The attempt is to present a conceptual frame which allows singling 
out different environments, and different forms of organizational and institutional 
innovations so that future research can ask to which extend observable patterns of 
innovations can be linked to specific forms of environments. The institutional 
environment here called economic regime might or might not set incentives for more 
innovation or innovation of a specific kind. The immediate advantage of such as 
conceptual set up is that geographical terms such as a region or a province need not 
longer be regarded as the proxy for the differences in the local business systems that can 
be observed. 
 
One obvious starting point for an analysis of economic transformation is the comparative 
business systems literature (Whitley 1997; Hollingworth, 1994).  With the help of a 
typology relying on a set of carefully isolated features that grasp the differences and 
similarities the analysis offers a systematic description of different market economies. 
While the typology of different forms of market systems relies on actual cases, from the 
point of view of transition economies the variety within what is called a capitalist system 
takes the form of “blueprints”.  Some countries might opt for an economic system in 
which the central states still plays a major role, as in the case of France, others might take 
Thatcher England, as the model they want to copy.  The findings of the comparative 
business systems-literature can therefore be used to describe “what is on the menu”, 
meaning which type of business systems will be considered when the political elite 
decide on transforming the economic system 
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With the CCP still in power it is hard to model the political process which caused the 
Communist Party to opt for their reform policy neither can we model the process by 
which the “local state” decides on a specific regime type. Yet, what can be done is to see 
the effects of “constitutional choice” on the transition path and the further interaction 
(between local and central government agencies) once decentralisation has been 
establishment. There is first the Public Choice Theory (overview in Mueller 1989) 
Leaving aside the normative approaches (Buchanan 1962) where institutional change 
(and economic performance) is linked to (democratic) voting mechanism, the public 
choice offers an extensive literature on “federalism” (starting with Buchanan and Tullock 
1962; Oates 1972, Tiebout 1956; Inman and Rubinfeld 1998) where it is explored under 
which conditions jurisdictional competition is a strong surrogate for national legislation 
and ill-functioning market competition. For the case of China it was argued that Fiscal 
Federalism is a strong surrogate for missing market competition in particular when 
democratic voting mechanism don’t exist. (Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Cao, Qian and 
Weingast, Litwack 2002; Alesina 2003; Qian and Weingast 1997). 
 
The third set of approaches centres on the observed clustering of economic activities 
when conventional analysis would predict that a spreading of activities offers higher 
rewards. This approaches can be found in behavioural economics; (Leibson and 
Zeckhauser 1998; Thaler, 1991, Schotter 1981), theories on effective co-operation 
(Buchanan 1965; Ostrom 1990; Greif 1993; Besley et.al. 1993), collective action (Olson 
1965), and more recently social capital (Halpern 2005). Leaving behind the world where 
economic agents act as price (or institutional constraint) takers, the normative and 
strategic complications in bargaining situations reveal the scope and scale of institution 
building by private (as opposed to public/political) individual agents or groups. The 
emergence of new norms, new organisations and new business procedures – aside from 
the element of surprise that accompanies all innovation – help to streamline behaviour via 
the accompanying enforcement mechanism (Baurmann 1996; Schlicht 1998). Yet, 
simultaneously, these institutions also offer positive incentives for new actors to enter the 
economic market (Williamson 1985; 1993; Aoki 2001). In other words a multitude of 
jurisdictions can emerge as the outcome of private collective action governed by 
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collective agents, such as guilds, networks, business communities. Theses jurisdictions 
can be incorporated into the economic regime, thus making them part of the formal 
institutional architecture leading to a “corporatist state”, be co-opted (and controlled) by a 
state bureaucracy as in developmental states, or be accepted as part of functioning 
markets indicating co-operation of otherwise autonomous economic actors (see in 
particular the literature on new economic geography such as Grabher and Stark 1997). 
 
In what follows insights from all three set of approaches will be employed while 
empirical studies will be used to draw attention to the evidence that strengthen the 
argument. The basic idea is that if one can identify economic regimes on the one hand, 
and patterns of organisational and institutional innovativeness on the other, then further 
empirical test could contribute to gaining insights of institutional change, and the path 
dependency which starts by choosing the initial commitment to market reform. To this 
purpose the following offers a two-level analysis. It starts with a descriptive analysis of 
institutional change initiated and negotiated in the political sector. This includes to 
identify political actors, and to define proto-types of economic regimes, all of which 
compatible with a “capitalist” system amongst which political actors can choose. Though 
not much is yet known about the functioning of the process by which in Reform-China 
the different levels of government interact, some general features help to cautiously 
define some assumption on the selection of economic regimes. The second level of the 
analysis focuses on organisational and institutional innovation in and around the 
emerging private sector. Such a analysis also needs to start with the question about the 
new economic actors. As will be shown both the new business community and local 
government agencies, being the main force in China’s economic transformation jointly 
establish new organisations and institutions. Before the analysis will elaborate on the 
three new institutions which distinguish China from other transition economies and 
whose contribution to the fragmentation of a national economic regime could be 
empirically tested, a short description of factors which influence institutional and 
organisational choice will be offered.  
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SECTOR 
 
Who initiates institutional change? 
 
In contrast to the European cases of transition economies, China’s reforms started with a 
fuzzy commitment where a socialist and a market economic sector still co-exist. Unlike 
the European cases where the commitment to a market economy started with privatizing 
state controlled assets and firms, in China the commitment to a “market economy” was 
split into a political commitment by the central government and an administrative 
commitment by local governments through devolution of power. Rather unique for a 
transition economy government agencies at all levels can “farm out” regulatory power 
and policy implementation in return for negotiated revenues2. The farming out policy is 
based on contracts between different layers of government, and often enough 
complements or competes with state activities implemented by specialised bureaucracies. 
The traditional dual leadership at local level can therefore be interpreted as the co-
existence of two forms of (state) governance, namely bureaucratic procedures on the one 
side and contracting between different layers of government, on the other side which 
often creates confusion in the interpretation of Chinese statistics. Not enough is known 
about the “rules of the game” of the farming out procedure, and not enough data are 
available that would allow linking specific levels of government to specific “preferences” 
of economic regimes. Provinces can decide how to further decentralise regulatory power 
and tax authority to the effect that what is the prerogative of the township in one locality 
is the prerogative of a district in another locality (Zhu and Krug 2004). Thus for example 
the central government made an attempt to establish a “rational” tax bureaucracy (Zhu, 
Krug and Hendrischke 2004; Wong 1992, 2002; Brean 1998) to the effect that today there 
are national taxes levied and enforced by a national tax administration next to the tax 
farming system which dominates local taxation. It is therefore more appropriate to talk 
about local autonomy characterised by horizontal and vertical competition for resources 
and regulatory power than to talk about fiscal federalism.  
 
                                                 
2 A detailed Analysis can be found in Zhu, Krug and Hendrischke 2004) 
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A short overview over the literature reveals that most analyses fails to operationalise what 
is meant by the local state. Regardless whether the Fiscal Federalism argument (Qian and 
Weingast 1997; Qian 2000) or the empirical studies on “Central-local” relations or the tax 
system (Gong and Feng 1994, Wong 1992; 2002; Brean 1998), the studies are unspecific 
when it comes to which level of government or administration is involved in which kind 
of regulation or taxation. On one side this corresponds with the decentralisation policy of 
the central state which on purpose left further decentralisation moves to the provinces. On 
the other side this reflects a “weak” central state where different localities can opt for 
different power sharing arrangement. Undisputed, however is, that sub-provincial 
government agencies, in particular at county and township level together with new non-
state firms became the main agents for institutional change in China. As will be shown 
later, local autonomy is one of the institutional innovations which characterise China’s 
emerging business systems.  
 
What is there to choose: a typology of economic regimes 
 
Based on the empirical studies of the comparative business systems literature three types 
of economic regimes can be described all of which are compatible with the initial 
commitment to a market economy, and which could serve as a blueprint for transition 
economies. The Arm’s Length State best imagined as the regime that comes closest to the 
neoclassical state, the Developmental State in which state agencies control sectors and 
plan economic development, and the Pre-corporatist State where the state delegates 
authority to certain social groups which unlike in the usual definition of a corporatist state 
do not need to be formally recognised (Schmitter 1974).  
 
 
 
Table 1: Economic Regimes 
 
Key characteristics Arm’s Length State Developmental State Pre-Corporatist State 
Involvement in 
development and 
transformation 
State as neutral arbitror 
Low taxation small range 
of regulation 
State as planner and 
regulator 
resource control  
Planned development 
State as “partner” 
Authority-sharing 
Scope and nature of Contractual relations Sector-specific control Bargaining with the 
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voluntary business 
relations 
between equal judicial 
persons 
corporatist sector 
Organizational choice  Toleration of new 
organizational forms 
Sector-specific 
organizational forms 
Fuzzy organizational 
choice 
Property rights regime Individual, Private law Public-private Collective consensus 
Innovation and 
experimentation 
Market driven R&D 
firms 
State education 
State R&D 
Network-driven 
Selection, economic 
performance 
Competition State defined constraint Internal negotiation 
Standardisation 
Technical and 
business practices 
Investor driven  
Market wide 
Technical \Sector wide Inertia 
Random change 
 
 
 
At the most general level the three types can be distinguished by the following features: 
 
(1) Involvement in transformation and economic development. In the Arms Length 
State the state remains aloof, as a neutral arbitrator, limiting itself to a set of tasks defined 
by the provision of public goods and connected with national sovereignty. In contrast the 
Developmental State sees itself as a dominant planer and regulator of economic 
development. For doing so government agencies will be established that directly control 
resources, protect industries or offer monetary incentives for politically agreed upon 
economic activities, such as investment in R&D or education. The Pre-corporatist State 
establishes and safeguards its legitimacy by authority sharing with social groups whose 
co-operation is perceived as essential for economic development. 
(2) Scope and nature of voluntary business relations. The Arm’s Length State is 
characterized by rule-based governance and a (independent) judiciary guaranteeing 
contractual security for business partners. The Developmental State in contrast defines 
(sector-specific) constraints for those economic activities over which the state claims 
control, which in turn will be enforced by a professional bureaucracy. Voluntary 
exchange (or investment) is thereby limited to sectors outside state control. In the Pre-
Corporatist State business relations depend on bargaining within the corporatist sector 
while voluntary exchange is limited to activities not claimed by “networks”. 
(3) Organizational choice. The Arm’s length state tolerates all forms of co-operation 
and organizations as long as their purpose is not to limit competition and free exchange, 
such as monopolies.  The Developmental State in contrast often enough establishes state 
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controlled monopolies or cartels, defines entry barriers for newcomers often including 
specific requirements for the organizational form. The Pre-corporatist State networks can, 
but need not be protected as the dominant form for organizing production and exchange. 
Whether network-supported sectors develop into state-guaranteed (local) monopolies 
depends on domestic and external competition, as well as the interaction between these 
networks and the political leadership.  
(4) Property rights regimes. While the Arm’s Length States establishes private 
property rights the Developmental State limits those to resources and sectors over which 
the “public” does not claim control. The Pre-corporatist State knows a large range of 
collective (or rather fuzzy) property rights where individual interests get represented by a 
collective actor. 
(5) Governance (incentives) around Innovation. In the Arm’s Length State innovation 
is market driven with firms and their R&D department as major agent. The 
Developmental State attempts to steer innovation via planning, formal education, or the 
establishment of science parks etc. supervised by a group of professionals within the state 
bureaucracy. In the Pre-corporatist State innovation and experimentation depends on the 
co-operation and support of those groups, which can mobilize the necessary resources.  
(6) Governance of Performance and Selection criteria. Which business venture 
succeeds or fails is decided in the Arm’s Length State by market forces, i.e. competition, 
while in the Developmental State technocratic entry and exit criteria supplement market 
forces. In the Pre-corporatist State where individual property rights are weak performance 
depends on the evaluation criteria of networks or are negotiated between networks.  
(7) Governance around Standardization of technical routines and business practices. 
Finally, the establishment of (technical) routines, or business practice, is driven by market 
forces in the case of the Arm’s Length State. In particular investment flowing into that 
routine or practice that promises highest returns will ensure the best practices get imitated 
across sectors. In the Developmental State standardization follows decisions within the 
state bureaucracy, while in the Pre-corporatist State standardization is either missing due 
to group-specific protection or appears as random change. 
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Inevitably none of these types will be found in reality in its “pure” form. What came 
closest to one of these types (the Arm’s Length State) were the attempts in Balcerowicz’s 
Poland, or Klaus’ Czech Republic. The case of China is instructive as one of the most 
striking features of the Chinese economy is the co-existence of all types of economic 
regimes established by different layers of government.  The typology invites empirical 
studies which cluster provinces, regions or township accordingly. Thus a procedure 
allows investigating which regime type facilitates economic growth. It would also 
prepare a common ground for research which kind of a business system, private sector, or 
types of firms will emerge.  
 
 
Limits of Choice: Factors influencing the selection of economic regimes 
 
Insights form the analysis of transition economies and New Institutional Economics but 
also growth theory allow listing factors for explaining the choice of an economic regime 
by different localities (and empirically test it).  
 
(1) Market size. Large size of production increases productivity and unleashes 
industrialisation (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988). Likewise, size of [expected] demand is 
crucial for the emergence of entrepreneurship and inflow of investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1987).  
(2) Labour market for “professionals”. The availability of skilled workers of people 
with an education that at low costs can be mobilised for working in the envisaged new 
private sector and new industries defines another threshold for the “spontaneous” 
development of markets and new sectors (Nee and Peng 1994; Xu 2001. See also Yarrow 
1998; Bian 1997; Benjamin and Brandt 2002).  
(3) State ownership. It is less the distribution of industries that explains the diversity in 
income, or but the ownership structure, more precisely the share of industries controlled 
by central [as opposed to local] planning. The higher the share of the centrally controlled 
sector, the less the range of activities for which local jurisdiction can design an economic 
regime (Smyth and Binder 2004; Guthrie 1999; Nee 2000). 
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(4) Income level. It is less the direct comparison of personal income, which is 
impossible to calculate in a socialist economy, but rather the transfers from the centre to 
local budgets which decides personal income and income chances. Moreover, The more 
dependent on allocations form the central budget the smaller the disposable revenue local 
government agencies have for financing institutional change (Bao et.al. 2002; Bean 1998; 
Zhu, Krug and Hendrischke 2004). 
(5) Attractiveness for (foreign) capital inflow. Additional capital leading to work 
place generation in new firms and industries mitigates institutional change. As was shown 
elsewhere (Cao et.al. 1997; Braunstein and Epstein 2002; Chen 1997a; 1997b; 1997c; 
1997d) locations where new firms offer workplaces find it easier to dismantle the 
socialist sector by laying-off workers, i.e. choosing a market approach for re-structuring 
industry, than places where such a policy would create long-term unemployment. 
 
It is not hard to see that the smaller market size, the more dominant the centrally 
controlled state sectors, the more relying on budget transfers and/or the less attractive for 
FDI, the smaller the range of activities the local state can formulate, implement and 
finance. An economic regime of the type of a Developmental State must remain 
ineffective so long as the local state fails to mobilise support of such groups which 
control visible, i.e. physical assets, or invisible, i.e. human capital and local knowledge, 
resources. It is this point which makes the type of the Pre-corporatist state such a viable 
alternative if it should be better placed to align the interests of the new business sector 
and local government agencies.  
 
(6) Capital stock. Investment decisions in the past followed political, military-
strategic decisions rather than economic considerations (Bickford 1994). For this reason 
the capital stock of local jurisdictions and its infrastructure differ widely to the effect that 
in particular communication and infrastructure offered an advantage [or disadvantage] at 
the beginning of the reforms. Another feature is that due to the socialist past private 
capital accumulation is missing. How to privatise the state sector depends in this case on 
the decisions to whom the initial ownership rights are allocated which in the case of 
China had been the village.  
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(7) Land ownership. To embed ownership rights locally allowed local jurisdictions 
choosing between different courses of action, such as selling assets, or use-rights, 
establishing first ownership rights for firms, or MBOs (Krug and Hendrischke 2003; Oi 
and Walder 1995; Unger and Chan 1995. For a more general discussion see Vickers and 
Yarrow 1991). Moreover, being the de facto owner of land allowed local jurisdictions to 
convert land into Special Economic Zones, i.e. establishing two economic regimes within 
the boundaries of their jurisdiction. In general, as will be shown later land ownership 
strengthened local autonomy in particular in regions where land prices increased quickly, 
thus offering local governments an income source outside central control. 
(8) Positioning of local jurisdictions within the national political hierarchy. It is less 
the general opposition to the reform course but the relative positioning of local leaders 
that proves to be essential in policy decision making, such as choosing an economic 
regime. In the One-Party system of China, local politicians have to accommodate two 
“constituencies”: the upper-level (Party) hierarchies and, increasingly more, local 
demand. Formal and informal connections help to gain access to information, transfer 
income, and approval to experiments. Thus, for example, shortage of capital [for 
necessary investment] can be overcome either by lobbying for central subsidisation or by 
mobilising local resources, in return for handing out [economic] privileges or sharing 
authority with certain social groups (Goodman 1995; Nee 2000; Lan 2001). 
 
In short, the legacy of the past left an unequal distribution of assets and power positions. 
The result is a clear division between localities that face a soft budget constraint, and, at 
the other extreme local jurisdictions which almost completely depend on (national) 
transfers. As empirical studies have shown income form land management can easily add 
up to fifty per cent and more of total revenue (Zhu et.al. 2005). The more physical and 
political assets controlled by a local jurisdiction the softer the budget constraint and the 
more leeway it has to choose that economic regimes it sees best suited.  
 
(9) Administrative innovativeness.  Institutions need to be established which re-align 
the interests of political and economic actors (Nee and Cao 2004) by offering incentives 
for investing in market-conforming human and social capital. From this perspective the 
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decentralisation which marks the beginning of economic transformation can be seen as a 
move by which the central government secured compliance with the reform course by 
transferring resources and regulatory power to the lower administrative levels on whose 
compliance the enforcement depends. As said before China established a peculiar 
incentives structure in form of a dual administrative system that is expected to underpin 
the agreed upon multi-layered structure of governance. Aside from a central bureaucracy 
where professionals in return for a safe fixed salary act as agents of national or local 
governments, national legislation offers the possibility to “farm out” government 
activities to local jurisdictions or social groups. Coordinated via contracts with the 
superior agencies or informally via networks such an authority sharing system ensures 
that the lessee, i.e. the local governments can capture the gains “at the margin” and thus 
directly profit from local economic development. Regardless whether employed in 
taxation, land management, privatisation of industrial assets, or setting up local 
regulatory regimes this farming out policy ensures that the transformation gain is divided 
between the central and the local level (see the different contributions in Brean 1998. For 
a comparative view see Shleifer and Vishny 1994; 1993; Litwack 2003).  
 
To sum up, the factors singled out above can be assumed to influence institutional choice. 
In general, it can be assumed that only very few local jurisdictions will opt of an Arm's 
Length state, so long as the national level fails to establish the necessary infrastructure, 
such as the reforms of the judiciary, banks and financial market, and property rights, all 
programmes which would exceed local resources.  Whether to choose a Developmental 
or a pre-corporatist regime will depend amongst other things on the ability to mobilise 
entrepreneurship and local innovation in the emerging private sector. 
 
 
ORGANISATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
Economic regimes are established to last (North 2005). Yet in transition economy the 
problems looks differently. Here the dynamic process behind economic transformation is 
  Page 17
  
driven by new and old economic and political actors who search for institutions that help 
to better cope with uncertainty, and mitigate transaction costs which can be assisted by 
changes in the original economic regime (Qian 2000; Nee and Cao 2004; World Bank 
1994).  It is worth emphasizing that the case of transition economies is one of institution 
building, i.e. searching for institutions, and not one of institutional change where 
individual actors compare two or more known institutional alternatives whose expected 
returns can be calculated. Before the Chinese response to uncertainty, transaction costs 
and political constraints is described, some remarks on the new economic actors:  
 
 
Who initiates organisational and institutional innovation? 
 
The new economic actors which appear once an economic regime has been chosen are 
characterised by the fact that they are in control of scarce resources.  At the local level 
this are entrepreneurs, firms (i.e. corporate actors) and local government agencies. To 
start with the former: How to co-ordinate individual and firms’ economic business 
behaviour is not completely determined by any of the three economic regimes described 
earlier. Instead private actors contribute to institution building when they conform to one 
business practice (Krug 1999). The reason for doing so can be economic considerations 
when individual actors anticipate network effects due to positive externalities on the 
demand side. Another reason can be that these business practices are regarded as the 
“normal” way of doing business so that the functional value of such a form of governance 
remains unscrutinized (Krug 2002). In this case cultural factors begin to play a role, as 
these routines are remembered forms of how to invest, operate a firm and how to 
conclude a business.  Moreover, cognitive and social legitimation are forces which 
influence the decision of entrepreneurs (Baron and Hannan 2002) to embed firms in 
traditional social relations (Coleman 1986; Greif 1993; Granovetter 1985) which as many 
field studies have pointed out leads to starting a firm within a local context with whom 
the entrepreneurs are most familiar with.  
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The need to cope with an insecure quickly changing environment but also the lack of 
private savings or capital markets and the need to quickly acquire scarce market and 
political information make co-operation are profitable endeavour. As will be shown 
presently the co-operation can take the form of an alliance with local government 
agencies formalised as local autonomy. While a co-operation rent will be generated 
irrespective which economic regimes had been chosen, the sharing parameter depends on 
the regime-type with the Arms’ Length State leaving the highest share in ‘private’ hands.  
Networking on the other hand can but need not include government agencies. The reason 
for networking as a business strategy is that that competences and capabilities 
accumulated within the local nexus are non-transferable while networks open business 
opportunities across China. Before the three forms of new organisations: local autonomy, 
networks and corporate governance will be explained in detail, the question needs to be 
asked which factors shapes organisational and institutional innovation. 
 
Factors shaping organisational and institutional innovation. 
 
Most studies in Comparative Business Systems or New Institutional Economics assume 
that a constitution or national legislation establishing “defaults” for appropriate (market-
conforming or honest) behaviour function as hard constraints. In China as in all transition 
economies this assumption needs to be modified. Institutional change is frequent, caused 
not only by political changes but also by technical-economic development and the 
reaction to the distributional consequences of the transformation. Moreover the 
institutions which define the economic regime are rarely effectively enforced as the 
necessary agencies (the judiciary or state agencies) are missing or ill-functioning. Instead 
of imposing a hard constraint on individual economic behaviour, the economic regime in 
order to function depends on voluntary compliance or organisational and institutional 
innovation, which harnesses the formal architecture. 
 
The soft institutional constraint in China takes the form of a weak central authority where 
the co-existence of different local economic regimes allows economic actors avoiding the 
constraint at low cost. They can either move to (invest in) another jurisdiction, thereby 
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exploiting regulatory arbitrage, or they can influence local policy and formal institution 
building via their interaction with local government agencies. The emergence of a 
business system in China – and its difference to an economic regime – depends therefore           
on organisational and institutional innovation by private economic sector within the areas 
where the state does not interfere and on the interaction between private actors and the 
local government agencies.  
 
In the literature two distinctive set of approaches attempt to explain private economic 
behaviour in China. One group of authors assumes that organisational and institutional 
innovations reflect cultural norms, in particular networking or guanxi3. Another group 
stresses transaction costs to which private economic actors react in a systematic way4. To 
claim that culture, in the sense of norm-driven behaviour on the one side, and rational 
behaviour, i.e. systematically reacting to positive and negative incentives, are mutually 
exclusive misses the point. As is suggested in what follows, culture shapes the 
opportunity set for organisational and institutional innovation while transaction costs 
determine the employment or modification of such norms or traditional institutions.  
Three cases of organisational and institutional innovativeness can be singled out. Though 
the poor data base does not allow  cross – economic regime comparisons, there is enough 
illustrative evidence from field work to claim that these institutions do not reflect local or 
national culture but suggest search for other – economic or institutional factors. 
 
 
New organisations and institutions 
 
Corporate Governance as a means to reduce uncertainty. 
 
In a broad definition corporate governance refers “… to a whole set of legal cultural, and 
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who 
controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the 
                                                 
3 E.g. Tong and Yong 1998; Tsang 1998; Redding 1996; Park & Luo 2001; Luo 1997; Lovett et al. 1999. 
4 E.g. Batjargal & Lin 2002; Xin & Pearce 1996; Wank 1996; 1999; Gold et al. 1998; Bian 1997; 2001. 
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activities they undertake are allocated.“ (Blair 1995, 3). In the case of China where 
private firms need to be established and empowered, corporate governance refers to the 
search for a governance structure which is able to cope with political and market 
uncertainty while setting incentives for investment and commitment. This search process 
is reflected in the fact that economic development has been accompanied by 
organisational change in firms to the effect that today a multitude of different types of 
firm co-exist that are not captured by the official statistics5.  
 
Different localities in China still have firms with unspecified property rights where a 
community, as is the case with the TVEs, or a general bureaucracy claim quasi-
ownership. Yet most firms today are based on informal partnerships (as in the IT-sector) 
or formal and registered (corporations) property rights regime.  While the share in overall 
output of firms or SOEs working under an unspecified property rights regime has 
declined drastically in the years since the introduction of the Company Law (1994) with 
the result that the private sector contributed between 63 per cent and 71 per cent 
(collectives included) in 2003, this does not mean a complete retreat of the state sector 
(Economist,17.09.2005). Fieldwork (Krug and Mehta 2004; Krug and Hendrischke 2005) 
or case studies (Hendrischke 2003; 2005) show that bureaus, i.e. branches of national 
bureaucracies, or local government agencies keep a minority share in even privately 
established companies. They receive or can bargain for a share, as firms see this  a way to 
limit the grasp on the firm’s cash flow. By doing so managers and entrepreneurs further 
attempt to better “align the interest” (Nee and Peng 1994) of firms with government 
agencies. To the extent that these agencies, as for example local government agencies, 
profit from firms either directly (share on profit, tax revenue) or indirectly (investment, 
workplace generation, increase in land value) they have an incentive to co-operate by 
                                                 
5 While international organisations such as the World Bank or the OECD distinguish only between the 
state, collective and private sectors, assuming that the collective sector is more or less a kind of private 
sector, the Chinese classification system still reflects the administrative needs of its socialist past, amended 
by “self-employment”, private business, holdings, or TVEs, joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign 
companies. Any empirical analysis relying on these data runs the risk of overemphasizing political factors 
(as for example Walder 1995; Guthrie 2005), thereby missing the impact of economic development, such 
as specialisation gains, market and income differentials on the change of organisational forms (Nee and 
Cao 1995).  
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offering an attractive business and investment environment. The co-operation strategy 
leads to lower political and procedural hazard when local agencies protect the firms’ 
assets and contractual relations. In short, incorporating firms not only hardens property 
rights, at the same time it also allocates risk to specified owners. 
 
So far the property rights and risk consideration suggest an efficient “loss-management” 
for firms, and indeed strong incentives for rent-seeking. Yet the spectacular success of the 
Chinese firms can hardly be explained without the governance that distributed the 
innovation rent within firms and between firms and the share- or stakeholders. In 
transition economies innovation is dominated by technical innovation but includes 
managerial skill, as for example the talent and ability to change the organisational form of 
firms. Firms differ with respect to the premium they offer to technical as opposed to 
organisation/institutional innovation as well as the premium they offer to managerial 
competence as opposed to capital ownership.  While technical innovation is increasingly 
linked to the entrepreneurial rent in the private sector depending on access to venture 
capital, organisational innovation depends on incentive contracts with managers. On the 
one side there are the managers in SOEs, still tenured and paid according to the 
cadre/nomenclatura guidelines, who have few incentives to search for new products or 
productivity increasing factor combinations. On the other side there is the extensive use 
of crop-sharing contracts (Cheung 1969) where villages (or government agencies) as 
leaser and (new) managers as lessee negotiate the sharing parameter of the innovation 
rent (and risk) (Krug 1997, Li and Rozelle 2003; Dong et al. 2004). Most privatised 
TVEs (see overview in Li 2005) relied on management buy-outs where managers could 
convert their accumulated profits into shares. To dismiss this as insider trading or an 
indicator of corruption is to miss the point (for example Li 2005); what matters is that a 
governance structure was chosen which put a high premium on the innovation of 
managers and, by doings so helped transfer ownership to those who had been proven to 
be competent. 
 
In short the development of new forms of corporate governance was initially negotiated 
between managers, government agencies and networks. With the expansion of capital 
  Page 22
  
markets as markets for risk, registered private property rights, and the increasing use of 
incentive contracts for scarce managers it is not hard to predict a convergence toward 
incorporated firms. And indeed China’s private sector today is dominated by limited 
liability firms. The question is rather whether there are limits to this convergence and 
whether these limits imply a spatial or a jurisdictional (i.e. economic regime) dimension. 
  
To answer these questions two institutional constraints seem exceptionally important: 
The expansion of markets will lead to more choice in how to co-ordinate inter-firm 
activities and at declining transaction costs. Thus, localities where (more) markets 
function better will see a higher concentration of organisational forms that reflect pure 
economic considerations. On the other hand, the socialist legacy matters in particular 
with respect to firm size and sector. Former SOEs can be expected to receive more state 
intervention as they are concentrated in industrial sectors where the state remains in 
control via “shares” or regulation. Moreover, it can also be expected that former SOEs 
will invest in networking where political actors play a more significant role. The effect is 
then that localities where large (former) SOEs constitute a considerable part of the 
industrial structure will see less organisational and institutional innovation at the local 
levels, as there is not much to be gained for local government agencies and firms from 
co-operating. So long as the national state protects SOEs they might be driven to the 
margin of markets but can still control resources (Krug and Polos 2004). A further 
institutional factor which might contribute to a clustering of organisational forms is the 
economic regime chosen. While Arm’s Length States will interfere only in case free 
choice leads to monopolies or cartels, the Developmental State will limit privatization 
and organisational form according to politically defined development plans. In the Pre-
corporatist State finally, the organisational form will remain weak and depending on 
negotiation amongst “stake-“ and not shareholders.  
 
 
Networks and Networking as transaction cost saving devices 
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To claim without further empirical evidence that Chinese networks – labelled guanxi-
(personal) relations - are unique and therefore require a completely new social science 
approach has obfuscated the issues with general references to cultural values. To explain 
how networking which indeed is widely used in China works as a transaction cost saving 
device, a fresh look based on empirical studies (Gold et.al. 1988; Wank 1996; 1999, 
Yang 1994) is needed.  
 
From the point of view of individual economic actors in transition they face the 
alternatives of either doing something alone, or to embark on economic activities together 
with others, or to ask government agencies to provide those goods and service private 
economic actors find too expensive or risky to organise (Powell 1990; Coleman 1988; 
Ostrom 1990; Greif 1993). With ill-functioning markets and shrinking co-ordination by 
the old state sector, private collaboration offers a high co-operation rent and is 
unsurprisingly not China-specific but rather referring to the role of social capital in the 
transformation process (Grabher and Stark 1997b; Stark 1996; 1998; for China see for 
example Boisot and Childs 1988; 1996). The effect networking has on economic 
outcomes depends on the internal governance, network functions, and the interaction 
between networks and the different layers of government agencies. 
 
In the Chinese version, networks are a social mechanism for co-ordinating economic 
activities in which mutual trust, affinity, and norms of reciprocity limit moral hazard and 
define sharing rules (Jacobs et.al.2004; Redding 1996; Hendrischke 2004; Bian 2001; 
Yang 1994; 2002). Networks emerge when economic actors individually or by collective 
consensus opt for using this form of social mechanism. Though the hard core of networks 
is formed by primary groups, such as the family, classmates, colleagues or friends, the 
scale and scope of the networks is not limited to a predefined pool of trustworthy and 
likeable people. This has to do with the open boundaries, and low entry and exit costs: 
Individual economic actors can be members of several networks. To change from one 
business relation or from one network to another is seen as neither a breach of contract 
nor a breach of loyalty. Subsequently, the sanctions for doing so remain low. When a 
business relation no longer offers expected returns, the relation will be “de-activated” but 
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not ended in the sense that both partners remain socially connected as friends, colleagues, 
or family members. If enough individual actors do so then a network stops functioning as 
a mechanism for co-ordinating economic activities, yet retains its social functions. 
Likewise, entry to a network works via social acceptance as trustworthy and competent, 
judged by the fact that an outsider is doing business with one network member. 
  
In the language of economic sociology such networks allow smooth switching from weak 
to strong ties (Granovetter 1973; 1983). Individual economic actors will embark on 
networking when they expect that networks offer a more effective means to co-ordinate 
resources and activities than either the market or the discredited state bureaucracy. 
Individual economic actors benefit as networks help to find a “matching” business 
partner and turn an anonymous into a particularistic relation (Pfeffer et al. 1976; Peng and 
Luo 2000, an example for the labour market is given in Bian 1997). To know that one’s 
business partner is suitable, competent and reliable means that the cost component 
covering relational risks can be diminished or reduced. Therefore, networks contribute to 
the emergence of markets when prices/values of assets and business deals become less 
vulnerable to moral hazard. More important in a dynamic view is the effect that prices 
and exchange values reflect more exclusively scarcity, marginal costs or quality, which 
allows employing resources at their best use and thereby contributing to overall allocative 
efficiency (Batjargal and Liu 2002). This interpretation stands in clear contrast to the 
networking equals rent seeking equals corruption view which prevails in the analysis of 
other transition economies (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Cheung 1996.) These stress the 
incentives for a network to embark on rent-seeking activities. In a dynamic interpretation 
two other features are important for explaining the diversity and limit to rent-seeking. 
First, underperforming networks are not driven out of the market. Instead, they turn into 
dormant (Kuilman 2005) organisational forms, whose social capital or other assets can be 
re-activated (at low costs) should relative prices and rates of return change. Second, 
networks are nevertheless subject to competition. It is a form of diffused competition 
(Hannan and Carroll 1992) less steered by changes in prices (or marginal costs) of 
producers than by changes in attention or interest on the demand side. 
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In order to get and remain activated as a co-ordinating mechanism for economic 
activities, networks need to fulfil (economically) valuable functions. For this reason 
networks need to produce satisfying outcomes for their members. As fieldwork has 
demonstrated these functions reflect the economic initial condition and the weak 
institutional architecture of the business environment rather than the more technical 
transaction costs which refer to firm size, sectors, or technology. Networks function as 
institutional entrepreneurs responding to new opportunities and changes in relative prices 
inherent to economic exchange relations. They are established to overcome:  
 
(i) resource constraints (physical assets, human capital, lack of technology) by 
offering a governance structure for pooling resources (Peng 2003; Krug and Polos 
2004); 
(ii)  institutional weakness in form of ill-functioning markets, ill-defined property 
rights, and the ambiguity of the reform course by offering private property rights 
protection, “contractual” security, and access to market information (Wank 1999; 
Peng and Luo 2000; Xin and Pearce 1996); 
(iii) the public goods problem, more precisely the lack of investment in infrastructure, 
market-conforming education, or the judiciary by investing and operating public 
utilities, private labour bureaus and vocational training, but also law and 
accountancy firms (Bai et.al. 1998). Another aspect is that networks also offer a 
social mechanism where hard-to-exchange information, knowledge and 
experience can be jointly produced and shared, and thus the “liability of newness” 
(Krug and Polos 2004) in the new private sector be mitigated. 
(iv) the institutional vacuum as perceived by economic actors when they formulate 
concerns, if not expectations, to be negotiated with (local) administrations to 
jointly search for “suitable” rules and regulations (Hendrischke 2003; Oi 1995; 
Walder 1995). 
 
A second requirement that needs to be fulfilled so that networks will function as 
economic actors is their internal governance. They need to limit free-riding, while 
keeping incentives for voluntary contributions in form of information sharing and co-
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operativeness. As field studies have shown it is reputation and the system that one 
member vouches for the trustworthiness of the new entering member proposed which 
serves as an effective enforcement device (Hendrischke 2005). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the need to fulfil these four functions is not equally distributed 
across China. It is rather dependent on economic conditions and the economic regime 
chosen. For example, in the hinterland the resource constraint can be so dominant that 
networks will focus on this function mainly. Likewise, in localities where an economic 
regime was chosen that fits the pre-corporatist model, networking for getting access to 
the political sector looses its value to the extent that networks are already officially part 
of the political process. The different functions constitute the diversity of networks that 
can be observed in China. Yet, networks are not exclusively locally embedded. Instead 
they cut across local jurisdictions either by expanding along the technical transaction cost 
divide when they “specialise” on co-ordinating small firms for example, or cluster in one 
sector by forming alliances with the different layers of government. The costs for doing 
so are lowest in the Pre-corporatist State while the Arm’s Length State will insist on 
market competition. The Developmental State acknowledges if not fosters networks of a 
technocratic elite in charge of economic development. 
 
 
Local Autonomy as a means to reduce the costs for institution building 
 
Recalling that the Chinese reforms started when villages as quasi-owners of land offered 
incentive lease contracts to private households, that TVEs became the locomotive of 
growth in the Eighties, and that the majority of firms sees their interests best protected by 
embedding (registering and networking) the firms within local jurisdictions, one cannot 
but ask about the precise contribution of the ‘local state’ to economic transformation and 
development. Unsurprisingly the ensuing academic debates focus on central-local 
relations (Wong 1992: 2002: World Bank 1994), some claim that China is moving in the 
direction of a corporate (authoritarian) state (Unger and Chan 1995; Walder 1995), or in 
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the opposite direction when local government agencies and local interest groups 
impoverish the central state (Li 2005; Cheung 1996).  
 
Instead of taking sides in the debate, the following insist that the precise nature of local 
autonomy needs to be analysed before wide-sweeping effects can be predicted. It is worth 
recalling the local autonomy in China is not generated by national legislation separating 
legislative power, prerogatives and use of revenues. Instead it is based on two features, a 
‘weak’ central authority and negotiation as the dominant governance form. The notion of 
a weak central authority stands for a mix of intended and unintended policies. Most 
obviously devolution of power transferred regulatory power to local jurisdictions but they 
on the other hand could no longer rely on automatic transfers for balancing the budget 
(hard budget constraint).  
 
The functioning of local autonomy and its contribution to overall transformation and 
development depends first on the governance of public-private relations within the 
jurisdiction, and second on the governance of inter-jurisdictional activities. To start with 
the former, although local autonomy in China has a resemblance to the “commons” or 
Jointly Owned  resources (Ostrom 1990) the  dominance of  property rights over land (by 
the village)  on one side and physical assets (by managers and entrepreneurs) on the other 
suggest another analytical tool namely to conceptualise local autonomy is a constrained 
co-operation game between local government agencies and managers (entrepreneurs) as 
those groups which control the resource base of a locality (following Greif 2003). 
Economic development and institution building therefore depends on the interaction 
between these two groups. Both share an interest in economic growth of the local 
resource base, as each benefits from overall growth. Therefore both groups have an 
incentive to co-operate. Each group can increase its resources by investing in the resource 
base and by changing the sharing parameter to the detriment of the other group. 
Government agencies appropriate their share via (income) taxation, land prices, direct 
resource control and other forms of intervention, while firms can secure a satisfying share 
by moving (or threaten to move) to another jurisdiction offering a better “deal”, or 
moving into other, less controlled, lines of production (exit), or by individual contracting 
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over net taxes (tax base, tax rates and tax exemption) and collective bargaining. The 
relative bargaining position of firms is constrained by sunk costs or asymmetric 
information and corporate governance, while local governments need to acknowledge 
institutional constraints on their autonomy, more precisely interventions from superior 
administrative agencies. Each group can however improve its bargaining position by 
mobilising support both from ‘above’ and from below (employees or the local 
‘electorate’, both being weak partners however).  
 
While the interaction between the business sector and local government agencies will 
depend amongst other things on the functions of government agencies, their initial 
endowment, formal standing within the administrative hierarchy, frequency of 
interactions etc, and waits for a more specific analysis, what matters in the context here is 
the stability condition. Local autonomy will lead to a stable business environment when 
both local groups have no incentive to change institutions – the resource partitioning is 
accepted, none has an interest to mobilise support from above thus inviting intervention, 
and when the upper level government agencies see no reason to interfere. 
 
In how far does local autonomy contribute to the emergence of different business 
systems? Undoubtedly the devolution of power and revenue sources, such as proceeds 
from land management and the so-called extra-budgetary funds enabled local 
jurisdictions to design (and finance) a specific institutional architecture. The question is 
then whether we can observe patterns of institutional designs which go beyond one local 
jurisdiction unleashing a process by which several local jurisdictions “converge” to 
similar governance structures. In general competition is assumed to be the driving force. 
As capital (and skilled) labour will move to that jurisdiction where rate of return to 
investment (and human capital) is highest, the shared interest of managers, firms and 
local government agencies will force them to imitate “good practices”.  Yet, competition 
is not dominated by market competition. The Chinese economy knows also selection by 
political decision making which enables higher administrative levels or national policy to 
safeguard firms, industries or governance structures which otherwise would be driven to 
the margin or disappear completely. 
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Yet, there are also internal processes which drive localities toward a convergence of the 
institutional set up. First, there is as technical-economic process by which industrial 
districts emerge. As known since Marshall (Marshall 1920) positive externalities when 
(skilled) labour and intermediate goods are pooled, and knowledge is shared leads to the 
concentration of certain industries. Thus, the building up of supply chains, firm-financed 
training, and sharing of market-specific knowledge, but also the increased frequency of 
dealing with firms in the proximity, asks for an institutional setting whose boundary 
exceed those of one city district or township. New regional centres appear, such as the 
Pearl River Delta or the Lower Yangtze Delta where firms, but also local government 
agencies ask for better “harmonization” of rules and regulation. Second, the emergence of 
regional business systems can as argued earlier also be network-driven, revealing shared 
business practices and “habits”, rather than political objectives or economic incentives. 
Finally, the convergence of local institutions can be the product of national politics, when 
the centre or any other superior administrative level, intervenes. The centre can insist on 
the prerogative of national legislation and define sectors, and economic activities for 
which a national standard is defined and which will be controlled by a national 
bureaucracy.  
 
The three economic regimes offer different ways to cope with local autonomy. In the 
Arm’s Length State there will be a trend toward institutional convergence beyond the 
local nexus following the incentives for investors and revenue-maximising local 
governments. When assisted by a liberal policy acknowledging mobility of capital and 
scarce human capital, market integration will occur with a concentration of industries, 
supporting “transaction organisations6” and best practices which all together will lead to 
a standardisation via market competition. The Developmental State on the other hand will 
define and re-define sectors and economic activities over which the central state claims 
control either by a special bureaucracy or by asking local governments to act as the 
implementing agency. As said earlier, in this case standardization follows bureaucratic 
rules, which often enough reflect a political compromise. The Pre-corporatist state, 
                                                 
6 Transaction organisations refer to service providers such as banks, consultancy, legal services. 
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finally, will lead to the broadest range of institutional arrangement where innovation 
takes almost an at random form depending on the constant negotiation and re-negotiation 
within the local jurisdiction and between government agencies, as there is no clear 
criteria for selection. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: Paving the way for empirical research  
 
After having identified three types of economic regimes and three cases of organisational 
and institutional innovativeness which together shape the different business systems that 
can be observed in China, the empirical question is: Do we observe patterns of 
innovation? Do these innovation – any of which or all three together – concentrate on 
specific economic activities, sectors, or, indeed, regions? Conventional transaction costs 
economics (Williamson 1985) would expect that a concentration of economic activities 
and sectors reflect firm- and contract specific transaction costs. A geographical 
concentration, however, points to transaction costs which reflect high procedural 
uncertainty and missing private property rights. In this case to link patterns of innovation 
to economic regimes helps to assess to which extent the latter facilitate the general level 
or kind of innovation. If such a link can be established then it can be substantiated that 
institutional factors (at least partly) explain the heterogeneity in China’s business system. 
 
In a dynamic view the three organisational and institutional innovations can be seen as 
hybrid organisations which emerge when socialist planning no longer and market co-
ordination not yet functions. Some hybrids emerge with increasing income and wealth 
when property rights protection becomes an issue, but will not be nationwide enforced, or 
when increasing private production expands beyond the local nexus asking for 
nationwide functioning co-ordination mechanism, such as networks. In the context of 
economic transformation the question is whether these hybrids will disappear with further 
increases in income and further market expansion. One assumption is that jurisdictional 
competition, i.e. imitation of better performing business systems) will cause a switch 
from hybrids to market institution. Yet, as has been shown earlier (tab. 1), the chosen 
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economic regime can either facilitate or hinder this kind of convergence. Once more to 
link different business systems to different economic regimes of different income levels 
can help to gain insights in the overall effect of chosen economic regime and 
organisational and institutional innovation. 
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